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Abstract  This study examined the characteristics of teacher incentive pay programs
in the United States. Using the 2007–08 SASS data set, it found an inverse relation-
ship between union influence and districts’ incentive pay offerings. Large and ethni-
cally diverse districts in urban areas that did not meet the requirements for Adequate
Yearly Progress as defined under the No Child Left Behind Act are more likely to offer
a larger number of economic incentives. Although rural districts are likely to reward
teachers in hard-to-staff schools, they are not more likely to reward teachers who
are certified by the National Board or who teach in the subject areas of shortage, nor
are they more likely to offer multiple financial incentives.
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Reforming teacher compensation with incentive pay programs has been a frequently
discussed education policy for the recruitment and retention of highly qualified teach-
ers (Johnson & Papay, 2009; Liang, 2013a; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). In 2006,
Congress appropriated $99 million for the Teacher Incentive Fund. The program
aimed at reforming teacher and principal compensation systems to enhance student
achievement and improve the distribution of effective teachers. The appropriation
soared to $400 million in 2010 and remained as high as $399 million in 2011 and
$299 million in 2012. Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the
federal government issued the $4.35 billion Race to the Top Fund. This competitive
grant program encouraged states to provide additional pay to recruit and retain highly
effective teachers and principals, especially where they were needed most.
State policy makers have been promoting teacher incentive pay programs as well.
By the 2009–2010 academic year, states had enacted policies of providing financial
incentives to attract teachers in math (15 states), science (15 states), and special ed-
ucation (14 states). There were similar state policies for teachers teaching in schools
that were hard to staff due to high poverty levels (13 states), low performance (13
states), or geographic isolation (3 states). In addition, 31 states rewarded teachers
for earning certification from the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards
(NBPTS, or National Board), and 10 states rewarded them for raising student achieve-
ment (Education Week, 2011).
In spite of national interest, our knowledge base about the implementation of
these programs is still limited (Liang, 2013a; Loeb, Miller, & Strunk, 2009;
Podgursky & Springer, 2007). There is little empirical work with nationally repre-
sentative data that examines the influence of teachers’ unions on districts’ incentive
pay programs. In addition, we do not know much about the district characteristics
associated with the use of financial incentives for teachers within the context of ac-
countability and standards-based reforms. Understanding the influence of teachers’
unions and district characteristics constitute important implementation data for state-
and federal-level policy makers considering the direction of incentive pay policies.
It is also important to examine whether disadvantaged districts are more likely to
utilize these programs to enhance their capacity for human resource management
and improving student learning.
To fill the knowledge gap, this study used the nationally representative 2007–
08 Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) dataset to examine the influence of teachers’
unions on financial incentives offered by districts and the relationship between dis-
trict characteristics and districts’ use of these programs. Specifically, it addressed the
following research questions:
How did school districts in the United States use incentive pay pro-1.
grams to recruit and retain teachers in 2007–08?
How did the use of incentive pay programs differ according to the2.
influence of teacher unions?










This study used the principal–agent theory as the overarching conceptual framework.
According to this theory, a principal–agent relationship exists when the principal
contracts the agent to perform services and provide goods. The objective of the prin-
cipal is always to maximize the principal’s own payoff. A key assumption in this the-
ory is that various information asymmetries exist between the principal and the agent.
In the public education system, a school district employs teachers to teach and pays
them for their teaching efforts. However, the teachers have more information on
their teaching efforts and effectiveness in improving student achievement than the
district does. The key task for the district, therefore, is to design an incentive pay
scheme that will induce the teachers to perform in a way that is aligned with the dis-
trict’s goals and to produce the desired outputs at the lowest cost to the district (Dixit,
2002; Levacic, 2009).
To maximize its own welfare, according to the principal–agent theory, a district
will only choose to offer a certain type of incentive pay when the benefits exceed
the administrative and political costs of the program. The greater the influence and
opposition of teachers’ unions in the district, the higher the political costs for pro-
gram implementation and the less likely the district is to offer the program.
Conversely, greater influence and support from the teachers’ unions lowers the po-
litical costs and makes the district more likely to offer the program. In addition, dis-
tricts are more likely to offer incentive pay programs that meet their educational
goals and needs best. Therefore, if a district has high rates of teacher attrition in
some subject areas (e.g., mathematics), the district should be more interested in of-
fering targeted financial incentives to mathematics teachers.
Types of teacher incentive pay programs
District policy makers might choose to implement different types of incentive pay
programs. Some of the commonly offered programs are aimed at teachers (a) who
teach in subject areas of shortage (e.g., mathematics), (b) who teach in hard-to-staff
schools (e.g., geographically isolated schools), (c) who improve their knowledge
and/or skills (e.g., National Board certification), or (d) who perform exceptionally
well (Springer, 2009). 
The first two types of programs respond to market demands. Many schools and
districts find it challenging to recruit and retain teachers, especially in mathematics,
science, and special education (Podgursky, 2009). Because compensation is a major
factor affecting a teacher’s career decision of both entering the teaching field and
staying in the profession, one way to address the problem is to provide targeted pay
incentives. The additional earning opportunities may help with teacher recruitment
and retention and with the inequitable distribution of highly qualified teachers
among school districts. 
Alternatively, districts may choose to offer knowledge- and skill-based pay and
to reward teachers for developing their knowledge and skills (Odden & Kelley, 2002;







National Board certification. A growing body of empirical studies have shown that
a teacher’s certification by the National Board was positively associated with higher
student achievement (Cavalluzzo, 2004; Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2007; Goldhaber
& Anthony, 2007; Vandervoort, Amrein-Beardsley, & Berliner, 2004).
The fourth program rewards teachers for outstanding results in performance
evaluation. Within current national policy contexts, this is perhaps the most contro-
versial as well as the most broadly studied type of incentive pay program. There
exists a growing body of empirical studies on its use in the United States (e.g., Liang
& Akiba, 2011), and its impact on teacher practice (Liang, 2013b; Liang & Akiba,
2013) and student achievement (e.g., Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002; Figlio &
Kenny, 2007; Winters, Ritter, Greene, & March, 2009). A recent review (Liang,
2013a) showed promising, but not conclusive, impacts of these performance-related
pay programs on improving teacher practice and student learning.
To our knowledge, only a few empirical studies have examined districts’ use of
incentive pay programs for teachers. Balter and Duncombe (2008) found that to re-
cruit new teachers, 15.6 percent of districts in New York in 2004 offered additional
compensation for teachers certified by the National Board, but only 7.3 percent did
so for teachers teaching in hard-to-staff fields, and 0.4 percent did so for teachers
teaching in hard-to-staff schools. A study in California (Strunk & Zeehandelaar,
2011) showed that in 2008–09, 21.7 percent of districts offered incentive pay for
teachers certified by the National Board, while only 1.1 percent did so for math
teachers, 1.0 percent for science teachers, and 0.4 percent for teachers teaching in
disadvantaged schools.
Teachers’ unions and teachers’ incentive pay programs
Teachers’ unions have played a crucial role in education, and their positions have
often been a deciding factor in the implementation of many educational initiatives
and policies. The National Education Association (NEA) supported providing extra
compensation for teachers to teach in hard-to-staff schools or to earn National Board
certification but opposed tying pay to student test scores or subject areas of teaching.
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) supported giving additional compensa-
tion to teachers earning National Board certification, working in challenging schools,
and assuming extra duties. Unlike the NEA, the AFT supported providing extra com-
pensation for teachers in the subject areas of shortage (Koppich, 2010).
Historically, teachers’ unions’ opposition to linking teacher compensation to stu-
dent achievement has led to the failure of many performance-related pay (PRP) pro-
grams (Darling-Hammond & Berry, 1988; Hatry, Greiner, & Ashford, 1994;
Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Recent empirical studies have also consistently identified
an inverse relationship between union influence and the probability of districts’ of-
fering of PRP programs (Ballou, 2001; Goldhaber, DeArmond, Player, & Choi, 2008;
Liang & Akiba, 2011). For example, Liang and Akiba (2011) found that relative to
districts having collective bargaining agreements, the probability of offering PRP was
19.8 percentage points higher for districts with meet-and-confer plans, and 35.4
points higher for districts with no bargaining agreements. West and Mykerezi (2011)







pensation, including the use of different incentive pay schemes. They found that
teachers’ unions tended to support incentive pay programs that were based on addi-
tional qualifications or duties, but tended to discourage programs that directly re-
warded teachers for improved student test scores. 
District characteristics and teacher incentive pay programs
Studies on teacher mobility have consistently shown that teachers in the subject areas
of shortage were more likely to leave the profession than were teachers specialized in
other subjects (Henke, Zahn, & Carroll, 2001; Ingersoll, 2001; Kirby, Berends, &
Naftel, 1999; Podgursky, Monroe, & Watson, 2004). In addition, teacher attrition
rates were higher in districts with higher student enrollment (Mont & Rees, 1996;
Murnane & Olsen, 1989, 1990) and higher proportions of ethnically diverse students
(Carroll, Reichardt, Guarino, & Mejia, 2000; Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Mont
& Rees, 1996). Compared with suburban districts, attrition rates were higher in urban
and rural districts (Kirby, Berends, & Naftel, 1999; Monk, 2007). Therefore, large
and ethnically diverse districts in urban and rural areas were in greater need of highly
qualified teachers. One would expect them to be more willing to use financial incen-
tives as a policy lever to combat the uneven distribution of highly qualified teachers. 
On the other hand, implementing and sustaining these programs often requires
substantial and continuous financial investment. Within the current context of budget
cuts and financial constraints, these high-need districts, particularly small rural dis-
tricts, may lack the financial capacity for program implementation and sustention. 
The existing literature on financial incentives for teachers focuses on state level
policies and initiatives (Clotfelter, Glennie, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2008; Fowler, 2003;
Loeb, Miller, & Strunk, 2009; Steele, Murnane, & Willett, 2010), and particularly
on the PRP programs (Belfield & Heywood, 2008; Goldhaber et al., 2008; Liang &
Akiba, 2011). Few studies are available that use nationally representative data to ex-
plore the implementation of incentive pay programs across the country.
Using survey data on 494 school district superintendents in New York State in
2004, Balter and Duncombe (2008) examined the use of financial incentives to recruit
new teachers. They found that larger school districts were more likely to offer financial
incentives, particularly for National Board–certified teachers. High-need rural districts,
however, were less likely to do so. In addition, their study suggested that districts
using only a limited set of recruitment practices hired less qualified teachers.
Using California data, Strunk and Zeehandelaar (2011) found that districts with
more Hispanic students were more likely to offer incentives either for bilingual/ESL
teachers and teachers of special education, but less likely to reward teachers for
National Board certification. Rural districts were significantly less likely than subur-
ban districts to offer an incentive for certification by the National Board for
Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS), and larger school districts more likely to
offer a bundle of incentive pay programs.  
Because in California it is mandatory that districts negotiate with teachers’ unions
on teacher compensation policies, Strunk and Zeehandelaar (2011) did not factor
the influence of teachers’ unions into their study. In addition, districts in California







Hispanic students in each district was 43 percent, and over one fifth of districts had
a Hispanic population over 70 percent. During the same period, the national average
of Hispanic students was 13 percent; in only seven states (NM, CA, TX, AZ, NV, CO,
and FL) were more than one out of four students Hispanic (Snyder & Dillow, 2011).
Furthermore, similar to Balter and Duncombe (2008), Strunk and Zeehandelaar’s
(2011) study focused on one state only. It is therefore important to examine the use
of financial incentives for teachers in other states with different local contexts and
policy characteristics.
Our study used nationally representative SASS data to examine the implemen-
tation of different types of teacher incentive pay programs in the United States. In
applying the principal–agent model, we developed two hypotheses: 
Districts are more likely to offer teacher incentive pay programs1.
when there is less union influence in the district.
Large and ethnically diverse districts in rural and urban areas are2.
more likely to offer a larger number of teacher incentive pay pro-
grams than other districts.
Method
Data
This study used the district survey data from the 2007–08 Schools and Staffing
Survey (SASS). The SASS produced the largest and most nationally representative
datasets on elementary and secondary schools, districts, and teachers in the United
States. The district survey in the SASS contains rich information on district charac-
teristics and policies, such as student enrollment, staffing patterns, teacher recruit-
ment and retention practices, and salary schedules.
The SASS used a complex and stratified probability sample design to acquire
sufficient data for estimates. The 2007–08 SASS sample was a school-based stratified
probability-proportionate-to-size sample. All schools except those funded by the
Bureau of Indian Education were sampled using multiple stratification factors, in-
cluding grade range and school type. The districts associated with the sampled public
schools were selected as the district sample. However, all districts in Delaware,
Florida, Maryland, Nevada, and West Virginia were included in the sample to im-
prove the reliability of SASS school district estimates. The data were collected by the
Census Bureau via mailed questionnaires with telephone and field follow-up. The
response rate was as high as 87.8 percent (Aritomi, Coopersmith, & Gruber, 2009).
Variables
Teacher incentive pay programs
In the questionnaire, district officials were asked, “Does this district currently use
any pay incentives such as cash bonuses, salary increases, or different steps on the
salary schedule?” to (a) reward teachers who have attained NBPTS certification, (b)
reward excellence in teaching, (c) recruit or retain teachers to teach in a less desirable







variables were created for each type of incentive pay program by recoding the offi-
cial’s responses as either 1 or 0, where 1 = district offering the particular type of
teacher incentive pay program, and 0 = otherwise. Another dummy variable was cre-
ated based on the sum of the district officials’ answers to the four questions, with
1 = district offering two or more incentive pay programs, and 0 = otherwise.
Appendix A provides the list of all the variables and their coding schemes.
Influence of teachers’ unions
District officials were asked, “Does this district have an agreement with a teachers’
association or union for the purpose of meet-and-confer discussions or collective
bargaining?” with possible responses being, “Yes, meet-and-confer,” “Yes, collective
bargaining,” and “No.” Two dummy variables were created for districts with meet-
and-confer discussions and districts with no bargaining agreements. Districts with
collective bargaining agreements with teachers’ unions were used as the reference
group. These classifications have been commonly used to measure the influence of
teachers’ unions in districts (e.g., Liang & Akiba, 2011). They were important in ad-
dressing the first research question of this study.
District characteristics
The variables for district characteristics included (a) poverty level, as measured by
the percentage of students approved for free or reduced-priced lunch; (b) ethnic di-
versity level, as measured by the percentages of ethnic minority students; (c) district
size, as measured by K-12 enrollment; (d) location, as measured by two dummy
variables for rural districts and urban districts, with suburban districts as the refer-
ence group; (e) Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) status as defined under NCLB, coded
as 1 (the district made AYP at the end of the last school year) and 0 (otherwise); and
(f) the normal yearly base salary for a teacher with a Master’s degree and no teaching
experience on the salary schedule. Appendix B presents the descriptive statistics of
the variables in the study.
Analysis
The SASS utilized a complex sampling methodology including stratifying the school
sample, oversampling new teachers, and sampling with unequal probabilities.
Therefore, weights should be used to adjust for differential sampling probabilities
and for differential non-responses. Direct estimations of sampling errors that assume
a simple random sample would underestimate the variability in the estimates. The
preferred method of calculating the standard errors to reflect these sampling design
characteristics was to use replication with the balanced repeated replicate weights.
This method constructed replicates from the full sample and computed the statistics
of interest for each replicate. The mean square error of the replicate estimates pro-
vided an estimate of the variance of the statistic for the full sample (Aritomi,
Coopersmith, & Gruber, 2009).
Given the complex sampling methods and variance estimation procedures in
SASS, this study used AM statistical software (version 0.06.03 Beta) developed by







methods with the 88 replicate weights in the district data file for the replication pro-
cedures. The final weighting variable was linearly transformed to reflect the actual
sample size. Missing and extreme values were replaced with the series means. 
To answer the first research question, descriptive statistics were calculated and
reported. To address the second and third questions, a series of binary logistic re-
gressions were conducted to examine the relationship between district characteristics
and districts’ probability of offering each type of incentive pay programs. The models
took the following basic form:
In this form, p was the probability that a district would offer a specific type of
incentive pay program. The coefficients b1 through b9 represented the associations
between each district characteristic and the dependent variable, and e was the ran-
dom error term.
Results
Union influence and districts’ offering of incentive pay programs
As shown in Table 1, during the 2007–08 academic year, 24.5 percent of districts in
the United States used financial incentives to recruit, retain, and reward teachers for
National Board certification, 10.2 percent for excellence in teaching, 15.4 percent
for teaching in subject areas of shortage, and 5.7 percent for teaching in challenging
schools. About two fifths offered at least one incentive pay program, and 12.0 percent
offered two or more at a time. 
Table 1. Incentive pay programs offered by districts in the 
United States: 2007–08 (N = 4,601)
Union influence and districts’ offerings of incentive pay programs
Figure 1 presents the percentages of districts that offered different types of incentive
pay programs, categorized by the influence of teachers’ unions in the district. The
upper line represents the districts with no bargaining agreements, the middle line










Incentive Pay Programs Percentage
National Board certification 24.5%
Performance-related pay 10.2%
Subject areas of shortage 15.4%
Hard-to-staff schools 5.7%
One or more programs 39.0%
Multiple incentive pay programs 12.0%
Figure 1. Percentages of districts that offered various 
teacher incentive pay programs
Note: Based on the Schools and Staffing Survey, 2007–2008.
As shown in Figure 1, of the four types of programs, districts were consistently
most likely to reward teachers who were certified by the National Board, as sup-
ported by teachers’ unions. In comparison, smaller percentages of districts rewarded
teachers in subject areas of shortage; such rewards were opposed by the NEA but
supported by the AFT. Surprisingly, although both the NEA and the AFT were in
favor of providing teachers with additional pay for teaching in hard-to-staff schools,
the data showed that this program was the least commonly used. The percentages
of districts offering PRP programs varied significantly across the three groups.
In addition, we could see a consistent and inverse relationship between the in-
fluence of teachers’ unions and districts’ use of incentive pay programs. Compared
with the districts that had collective bargaining agreements, higher percentages of
districts with meet-and-confer discussions offered financial incentives for National
Board certification (25.80% vs. 21.40%), performance-related pay (8.00% vs.
3.70%), teaching in subject areas of shortage (15.80% vs. 12.00%), and teaching in
hard-to-staff schools (7.60% vs. 2.90%). In addition, the percentage of the meet-
and-confer districts that used multiple incentive pay programs was almost twice that
of the districts with collective bargaining agreements (13.60% vs. 7.30%). 
In a similar pattern, districts that had no agreements with teachers’ unions were
more likely than meet-and-confer districts to offer more financial incentives. Among
the districts with no agreements, 28.80 percent provided financial incentives to teach-
ers certified by the National Board, over one fifth rewarded outstanding teacher per-
formance (20.80%) and teaching in subject areas of shortage (20.50%), and 9.20
percent had programs targeting teachers in hard-to-staff schools. In addition, 18.6







Based on the findings from Figure 1, a series of Chi Square tests of independence
were performed, and the results are presented in Table 2. Again, we saw inverse re-
lations between union influence and districts’ offerings of teacher incentive pay pro-
grams, and the differences were statistically significant at the .001 level across the
programs.
Characteristics of the districts offering teacher incentive pay
programs
A series of logistic regression analyses were conducted to further examine the influ-
ence of teachers’ unions and district characteristics on districts’ offerings of incentive
pay programs. Since a previous study (Liang & Akiba, 2011) has examined the of-
fering of PRP programs using the same data, this study focused on the other teacher
incentive pay programs and the use of multiple programs. Table 3 presents the lo-
gistic regression results.
The first model focused on the financial incentive for National Board certifica-
tion. Controlling for other factors in the table, the logit of offering this program for
meet-and-confer districts was 0.301 higher than for collective bargaining districts.
In other words, the probability of offering this program for meet-and-confer districts
was 7.5 percentage points higher than for collective bargaining districts. The proba-
bility was 17.9 percentage points higher for districts that had no bargaining agree-
ments. In addition, a one point increase in the percentage of students receiving free
or reduced-price lunch was associated with a 0.1 percentage point increase in the
probability of district program decisions. A one point increase in ethnic minority







Program Type Negotiation Type
Yes No
Chi Square Test
n % n %
National Board
Certification
Collective bargaining 527 21.4 1937 78.6
χ2(2, N = 4,601) = 29.51
p = .000
Meet-and-confer 129 25.8 371 74.2
No agreements 471 28.8 1166 71.2
Performance
Related Pay 
Collective bargaining 91 3.7 2372 96.3
χ2(2, N = 4,599) = 315.32
p = .000
Meet and confer 40 8.0 460 92.0
No agreements 340 20.8 1296 79.2
Subject Areas of
Shortage
Collective bargaining 295 12.0 2169 88.0 χ2(2, N = 4,601) = 55.32
p = .000Meet-and-confer 79 15.8 422 84.2
No agreements 336 20.5 1300 79.5
Hard to 
Staff Schools
Collective bargaining 71 2.9 2393 97.1 χ2(2, N = 4,601) = 78.21
p = .000Meet-and-confer 38 7.6 462 92.4




Collective bargaining 179 7.3 2285 92.7 χ2(2, N = 4,601) = 121.73
p = .000Meet-and-confer 68 13.6 432 86.4
No agreements 305 18.6 1332 81.4
Table 2. Chi Square tests of union influence and districts’ offerings of incentive pay programs
offering the program. An increase of 1,000 students in districts’ enrollment was re-
lated to a 0.7 percentage point increase. 
In addition, the probability of using such a program for urban districts was 13.2
percentage points higher than for suburban districts, but rural districts were not
more likely than suburban districts to do so. Furthermore, the probability for districts
that did not meet requirements for Adequate Yearly Progress was 16.8 percentage
points higher than for those that did. An increase of $1,000 in a district’s average
salary was associated with a 1.3 percentage point increase in program offering. These
findings have practical significance as well. For example, for a district with average
characteristics, as described in the sample in Appendix B (e.g., the average salary
for a teacher with a master’s degree is $36,717), the probability of rewarding teachers
for National Board certification was 4.1 percentage points. For another district with
the same characteristics but a salary of $46,717, the probability would be 17.1 per-
centage points, three times higher than the former.
The second model examined financial rewards for teachers in subject areas of
shortage (e.g., math, science, and special education). Again, districts with meet-and-
confer discussions and districts with no bargaining agreements were significantly
more likely than districts with collective bargaining to offer the program. In addition,











Hard to staff schools
Multiple incentive
pay programs







































































































































3950 3950 3950 3950
Table 3. Binary logistic regressions on the probability of districts’ offerings of incentive pay programs
Notes: a The probability change in the districts’ use of the teacher incentive pay program with a one-unit increase in each independent
variable controlling for the other variables in the models was computed based on the equation exp(B) / [1 + exp(B)] - .50; *p < .05,
** p < .01, ***p < .001
achievement were more likely to offer this program than other districts. The average
teacher salary in the district, however, was negatively associated with the probability
of rewarding teachers in subject areas of shortage.
The third model focused on rewarding teachers in hard-to-staff schools. The re-
sults were very similar to those for incentive programs addressing subject areas of
shortage, except in the percentage of poor students and the comparison between
rural and suburban districts. Controlling for other factors in the model, a one point
increase in the percentage of poor students was associated with a 0.2 percentage
point increase in the probability of offering this program. In addition, the probability
of rewarding teachers in disadvantaged schools was 9.6 percentage points higher for
rural districts than for suburban districts.
To better motivate the targeted teachers, districts may offer multiple incentive
pay programs at a time and make the rewards more substantial and attractive. The
last model explored districts’ offerings of multiple financial incentives. Again, districts
with less union influence were more likely to offer multiple incentive pay programs.
In addition, large districts in urban areas with a higher percentage of ethnically di-
verse students that did not make the AYP were more likely to offer multiple incentive
pay programs simultaneously.
Discussion
Using the nationally representative SASS dataset, this study is a first attempt to ex-
amine districts’ offerings of teacher incentive pay programs across the nation. During
the 2007–08 academic year, 39.0 percent of the districts in the United States em-
ployed at least one incentive pay program, and 12.0 percent used two or more fi-
nancial incentives for teachers. These percentages are smaller than those in California,
where 72.8 percent of districts used at least one incentive policy and 38.8 percent
employed multiple rewards (Strunk & Zeehandelaar, 2011). 
Consistent with the findings in the previous research on PRP programs (Belfield
& Heywood, 2008; Goldhaber et al., 2008; Liang & Akiba, 2011) and the princi-
pal–agent theory, this study finds that the influence of teachers’ unions is significantly
and inversely related to districts’ offerings of incentive pay programs. In addition, al-
though both the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Federation
of Teachers (AFT) are supportive of offering additional pay to teachers certified by
the National Board, our analysis shows a negative relationship between union influ-
ence and the districts’ use of this program. One plausible explanation may be that
teachers’ unions have been advocating and prioritizing providing teachers with pro-
fessionally competitive pay and raising salaries across the board, rather than offering
incentive pay programs. Research has shown positive associations between teacher
salary and teacher mobility (e.g., Imazeki, 2005), and student achievement (e.g.,
Akiba, Chiu, Shimizu, & Liang, 2012). 
In addition, we find that large and ethnically diverse districts in urban areas are
generally more likely to offer a larger number of incentive pay programs for teachers
than are small suburban districts with a more homogeneous student population. This
is consistent with the findings of a previous study (Liang & Akiba, 2011) on PRP and







teacher attrition and are in greater need of highly qualified teachers in high demand,
they are more likely to use these programs as policy levers to motivate teachers. For
a similar reason, districts that did not make the AYP are more likely than those who
made the AYP to offer incentive pay programs. 
More importantly, our analysis shows that although rural districts are more likely
to reward teachers teaching in hard-to-staff schools, they are not more likely to do
so for teachers certified by the National Board, teachers in the subject areas of short-
age, or to offer multiple programs simultaneously. Because small rural districts have
higher rates of teacher attrition and lower student achievement (Kirby, Berends, &
Naftel, 1999; Monk, 2007) and because incentive pay may be an important tool for
the recruitment and retention of targeted teachers, this finding is a concern.
Furthermore, we find that the average salary for teachers in a given district is a
significant factor predicting that district’s offering of incentive pay programs. Wealthy
districts with higher salary levels are more likely to provide financial incentives for
teachers who have demonstrated excellence by earning a National Board certification.
Since higher salary offerings give wealthy districts an advantage over poor districts,
this finding indicates that incentive pay programs may further exacerbate the unequal
distribution of highly qualified teachers across districts. 
Before discussing the policy implications, it is important to identify the limita-
tions of this study. In the first place, the district survey in the SASS data set does not
disaggregate the incentive pay programs for new and existing teachers, nor does it
contain information on the magnitudes or the types of the awards. A school district
may use different incentive strategies and offer different programs to recruit new
teachers and retain existing teachers. In addition, this study did not examine the ef-
fectiveness of these programs in recruiting and retaining the targeted teachers or en-
hancing student achievement. The existing literature has reached mixed conclusions
about the impact of financial incentive policies in California (Steele, Murnane, &
Willett, 2010), Massachusetts (Fowler, 2003), and North Carolina (Clotfelter et al.,
2008). Furthermore, the literature has suggested that financial incentives may intro-
duce perverse incentives (e.g., Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2009; Adams,
Heywood, & Rothstein, 2009). Although the different programs are often lumped
under the umbrella of financial incentives, it is important for future studies to ex-
plicitly distinguish between different types of teacher incentive pay programs.
Furthermore, given that school districts are nested within states, future studies may
consider using multilevel models to examine the variation in offerings of incentive
pay programs.
Although the effectiveness of teacher incentive pay programs is a major concern
for policy makers, it is also important to know the implementation characteristics
of these programs. This empirical study is the first across the nation to examine the
characteristics of school districts in relation to the different types of incentive pay
programs they offer to teachers. The findings have important implications.
Policy and leadership implications
Many schools and districts are having difficulty recruiting and retaining highly qual-







a small percentage (15.4%) of districts offer targeted financial incentives for those
teachers in high demand, and that an even smaller percentage (5.7%) offer incentives
for teachers in challenging schools. To maximize the equitable distribution of the
teacher workforce and to improve student learning, it is therefore important for dis-
trict leaders to revisit their teacher compensation policies and to prioritize providing
financial incentives to those teachers whom the district needs most.
Although small rural districts are often in greatest need of highly qualified teach-
ers, this study finds that they are not more likely to implement incentive pay pro-
grams to recruit and retain teachers with demonstrated excellence or teachers in the
subject areas of shortage. One plausible reason may be their lack of financial capacity
to implement or sustain teacher incentive pay programs. Given the national interest
in improving all students’ achievement, it is important for federal and state policy
makers to consider providing continuous, adequate, and targeted assistance to those
high-need districts.
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Variable SASS Variable Name: Description
Incentive Pay Programs
National Board certification
D0347, 1 = district offers pay incentives to
reward teachers certified by the National Board,
0 = otherwise
Performance-related pay
D0348, 1 = district offers pay incentives to
reward excellence in teaching, 0 = otherwise
Subject areas of shortage
D0350, 1 = district offers pay incentives to
recruit or retain teachers in fields of shortage, 
0 = otherwise
Hard-to-staff schools 
D0349, 1 = district offers pay incentives to
recruit or retain teachers in a less desirable
location, 0 = otherwise
Multiple incentive pay
programs
1 = district offers two or more teacher incentive
pay programs, 0 = otherwise
Teacher Union Influence
Meet-and-confer
D0296, 1 = district has an agreement with a
teachers’ union for meet-and-confer discussions,
0 = otherwise
No bargaining agreement
D0296, 1 = district has no agreement with a
teachers’ union on meet-and-confer discussions
or collective bargaining, 0 = otherwise
Student Characteristics
% free or reduced-price lunch NSLAPP_D
% ethnic minority students NMINST_D / D0276 * 100
K-12 enrollment D0276, total enrollment of K-12 students
District Characteristics
Rural district
URBAND8, 1 = rural school district, 
0 = otherwise
Urban district
URBAND8, 1 = urban school district, 
0 = otherwise
District AYP status
D0385, 1 = district made Adequate Yearly
Progress at the end of 2006-07 school year, 
0 = otherwise
Salary for Master’s degree
D0332, normal yearly base salary for a teacher
with a Master’s degree and no teaching
experience
Number of buildings AG_NOSC2
% ethnic minority teachers NMNTCH_D / D0295 * 100







N Min. Max. Mean SD
Teachers’ Union Influence
Meet-and-confer 4601 0 1 0.109 0.311
No bargaining agreement 4601 0 1 0.356 0.479
Student Characteristics
% free or reduced-price lunch students 4601 0 100 43.159 23.434
% ethnic minority students 4601 0 100 27.940 29.369
K-12 enrollment (in thousands) 4601 0 1100 3.018 13.798
District Characteristics
Rural district 4601 0 1 0.427 0.495
Urban district 4601 0 1 0.124 0.330
District AYP status 3107 0 1 0.269 0.443
Average salary for Master’s degree 
(in $1,000)
4601 15 70 36.717 6.213
